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CHAPTER 3 
REACTIONS TO THE FILM IN 1964 
 
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) marked the beginning of a period in 
the American past that historian Paul Boyer called the “Big Sleep,” during which public 
concerns about the bomb diminished.1 Despite the public’s lack of concern, some cultural 
commentators, pacifists, and scientists warned that the possibility of nuclear war still 
existed. Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964) 
warned audiences that US nuclear diplomacy had not eliminated the possibility of nuclear 
war. Many reviews of the film evaluated the merit of Stanley Kubrick’s political message 
rather than the film’s artistic value. Some audience members felt compelled to contribute 
to this discussion and wrote letters to newspapers and magazines. Although film critics 
and the general public did not unanimously accept Kubrick’s warning, Dr. Strangelove 
did inspire some discussion about the soundness of US cold war policies. When the issue 
of nuclear war emerged during the 1964 presidential campaign, the film became 
associated with individuals who appeared eager to wage nuclear war to end the cold war. 
 Boyer argued that after 1963 the bomb tended to diminish in American culture 
and thought. He provided five possib le explanations for this disappearance. First, the Test 
Ban Treaty gave the appearance that world leaders were working to eliminate the threat 
of nuclear war. Second, newspapers and television programs gave little attention to the 
bomb. The nuclear bomb became an abstraction in the minds of many Americans. The 
issue of nuclear warfare seemed more theoretical and distant than it had been in October 
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1962. Third, the possibilities for peaceful and beneficial uses for nuclear energy displaced 
public fears about the destructive power of the atom. Fourth, deterrence theory seemed to 
be an effective method for preventing nuclear war. Finally, the Vietnam conflict diverted 
the attention of those Americans who had expressed concerns about the threat of nuclear 
war.2 Despite dwindling concerns about the bomb, some Americans, including Kubrick, 
still discussed the threat of nuclear war in hopes of combating public apathy. 3 
 Although the production of Dr. Strangelove began before the Test Ban Treaty was 
signed, the film’s warnings were still applicable after 1963. The treaty may have eased 
many Americans’ fears about the possibility of nuclear war, but the treaty did not alter 
US nuclear policies. Kennedy appeased opponents of the treaty in Congress, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the scientific community by promising to continue nuclear testing 
underground. The United States also continued to develop and stockpile strategic nuclear 
weapons and rely on this arsenal to deter a first strike.4 The Test Ban Treaty did not lead 
to a more comprehensive treaty as many supporters had hoped. Indeed, talks of 
disarmament had been complicated by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to France and 
communist China. The threat of nuclear war still hung over the heads of audiences that 
saw Dr. Strangelove, but not all reviewers were willing to accept Kubrick’s warning 
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about the dangers of US nuclear strategies and the possibility of an accidental nuclear 
war. 
 Reviews of Dr. Strangelove assessed the film’s treatment of nuclear war and the 
realism of Kubrick’s scenario in order to refute or support Kubrick’s claims. Historian 
Robert Brent Toplin has recognized that films possess messages about social and political 
issues, either subtly or forcefully displayed. Toplin noted that critics and audience 
members have often discussed the messages of films.5 Reviews and subsequent public 
responses to Dr. Strangelove represented a limited discourse about the film that focused 
more on Kubrick’s political message and the reasonability of U.S. nuclear policies. 
Critics had widely varied views of Kubrick’s treatment of nuclear war. Some who 
wrote scathing reviews believed that Kubrick’s picture was pure fiction. Henry Hart of 
Films in Review called Dr. Strangelove  a farce constructed for the benefit of liberals and 
pacifists. He said that the film was “twirpish twiddle” that “kids around with the 
nonkiddable proposition” of an accidental nuclear war. Hart dismissed any similarities 
between Kubrick’s characters and their real counterparts.6 Philip K. Scheuer called Dr. 
Strangelove “an evil thing about an evil thing.” He suggested that Kubrick’s sexual 
references were childish and claimed that the film’s villains were disturbing rather than 
funny. Scheuer contended that the armed forces should be treated with more respect.7 
Also critical was Midge Decter, who, writing for the Jewish journal Commentary, wrote 
that many of the jokes in the “spoof” were “banal.” Decter lambasted Kubrick for 
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constructing each character as a radical conservative and failing to criticize any liberals. 
She stated, “Everyone, after all, is against psychotic generals and Nazis.”8 New York 
Times film critic Bosley Crowther called the film “the most shattering sick joke I’ve ever 
come across.” 9 Although he found some value in the film’s artistic achievements, 
Crowther believed that the film’s negative portrayals of government leaders and the 
“defense establishment” served no constructive purpose.10 These critics saw nothing 
humorous about Kubrick’s satirical treatment of the president and the armed forces.  
Others who were favorably impressed with Dr. Strangelove praised the film for 
the brilliance of its satire and for the importance of its political message. Marjorie Adams 
called Dr. Strangelove “a rather bitter, wickedly clever, tremendously amusing spoof of 
conditions which worry most of us in the dim reaches of the night.”11 Robert Hatch 
claimed that the film “holds a cold blade of scorn against the spectator’s throat.”12 
According to Hatch, Kubrick challenged the basic assumptions of the US cold war 
posture and exposed the erroneous political philosophy that reinforced those 
assumptions.13 Brian Forbes commented that Kubrick constructed a serious joke to 
display the dangers of the bomb to audiences. He contended that Kubrick had used the 
bomb “as a banana skin, with a nuclear prat fall as the ultimate pay-off gag.”14 Stanley 
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Kaufman did not believe that the film was a satire because it offered no alternative paths 
for the nation to follow, but he praised its comic assault on the military and US nuclear 
strategies.15 The Denver Post noted that the performances were “large than life, but in 
keeping with the spirit of the film.”16 These critics believed that the film’s comedic 
treatment of the subject of nuclear warfare was provocative because audiences were not 
overwhelmed by the thought of nuclear Armageddon. Instead, audiences laughed at 
Kubrick’s satirical treatment of U.S. cold war strategies, and, at the same time, they 
worried about the dangers he exposed within those strategies. By praising Dr. 
Strangelove, these reviewers helped to call attention to lingering dangers of nuclear war 
and encouraged readers to see the film.  
Reviewers formed different opinions about the realism of Kubrick’s scenario. 
Alastair Buchan, the Institute of Strategic Studies official who originally recommended 
Kubrick read Peter George’s Red Alert (1958), criticized the director after the film’s 
release. Buchan said that he had warned Kubrick that the film could not accurately depict 
the possibility of an accidental nuclear war because he could not describe the precautions 
the US and other nuclear powers had taken to prevent an accidental nuclear war. 
Reviewers such as Gerald Kaufman and James Price cited Buchan’s claims when they 
dismissed the possibility of an accidental nuclear war. 17 By denying that this possibility 
existed, critics refuted Kubrick’s cynicism about US nuclear strategies. No threat existed 
and therefore nuclear strategies were not flawed, but necessary to protect national 
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security. Henry Hart dismissed the film’s premise and argued that Kubrick had not 
provided audiences a looking glass through which they could view their own world. 
Instead, he had instead exposed his own “private” world of chaos and insanity. 18  
 Some critics recognized Kubrick’s desire to inspire a discourse about the bomb. 
Kubrick hoped that Dr. Strangelove would foster some discussion about the soundness of 
US nuclear policies.19 Several reviewers called upon audience members to discuss the 
film’s meaning and the rationality of US nuc lear policies. Stephen Taylor suggested that 
Americans must talk about the film in order for it to be successful. Taylor did not believe 
that Dr. Strangelove was a good film, but he believed that the picture marked “a 
beginning to large scale consideration of the folly of American and Soviet nuclear 
policy.”20 Marjorie Adams recommended that friends of different political beliefs should 
see the film and discuss Kubrick’s message. She believed that Dr. Strangelove would 
resonate with anyone who was interested in current events.21  
Letters that appeared in newspapers and magazines addressed the validity of 
Kubrick’s claims and the reactions of certain critics, further expanding the discourse 
about Dr. Strangelove and the bomb. Midge Decter’s harsh review in Commentary 
incited several rebuttals from readers who appreciated the motion picture. Anne M. 
Stadler of Seattle, Washington argued that the film was not a work of fantasy, but a 
fantastic realistic scenario. The fantastic elements of the story were matched by the 
realism Kubrick provided in the scenes in the Leper Colony and the “documentary” 
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depicting Americans fighting other Americans. The danger, Kubrick and some audience 
members believed, lay in the public’s belief that the bomb and the threat of nuclear war 
was a fantasy. Francis Miceli of Notre Dame, Indiana claimed that Dr. Strangelove 
condemned “our society for its rush to destruction…The movie is saying that liberals are 
impotent and that conservatives are in love with death.” 22 Miceli’s letter captured the 
essence of the motion picture better than most critics. Men had created a weapon that no 
one could control once it was unleashed. This criticism of Decter’s review suggested that 
some viewers accepted Kubrick’s message and believed that Dr. Strangelove needed to 
be defended against its critics. Without such a defense, the film might have a limited 
impact on public opinion.  
 Several letters published in the New York Times illustrated audiences’ conflicting 
opinions about the meaning and value of Dr. Strangelove. Some letters claimed that Dr. 
Strangelove was a piece of un-American propaganda. Robert Strausz-Hupe, director of 
the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania and author of 
several texts on nuclear policy and strategy asked, “Will it raise their [US servicemen’s] 
morale to be told that the men who lead them are imbeciles or neurotics?” Strausz-Hupe 
claimed the film accomplished the Communist goal of driving “a wedge between the 
American people and their military leaders.”23 Jeanne McQuade of Queens Village, New 
York called the film “straight propaganda” that was “unmatched by even our declared 
enemies.”24 Other audience members viewed the motion picture differently, believing 
that Kubrick had exposed a reality hidden by political rhetoric. Dana Hopkins of New 
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York commented that Dr. Strangelove offered the truth about man’s inability to control 
nuclear war. Ruth Cain of New York defended Kubrick’s picture, arguing that the 
director ridiculed the human race rather than simply the president or the military. 25 
Reviews and letters to the editor illustrated the positions of groups debating the nuclear 
issue. 
 In a letter to the New York Times screen editor, noted intellectual Lewis Mumford 
responded to Bosley Crowther’s review of Dr. Strangelove, defending the film as an 
important message to Americans. Mumford disagreed with Crowther’s negative 
assessment of Dr. Strangelove, calling it “the first break in the catatonic cold war trance 
that has so long held our country in its rigid grip.”26 Ten years earlier, in a collection of 
essays entitled In the Name of Sanity (1954), Mumford discussed a “catatonic trance” that 
would consume Americans driven underground by the fear of nuclear attack. People 
would withdraw from their lives and their surroundings, consumed by fear but unable to 
protect themselves. In the Name of Sanity had examined four nuclear scenarios, each 
similar to Kubrick’s scenario.27 Mumford believed that Kubrick’s satirical treatment of 
the possibility of nuclear war allowed audiences to view nuclear war from a distance. 
Kubrick’s picture helped Americans to recognize the flaws in U.S. nuclear policies.28  
Kubrick’s political message about U.S. nuclear policies became relevant during 
the 1964 presidential election. Reviewers and some audience members discussed the 
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validity of Kubrick’s message and the soundness of US nuclear policies, yet the film 
played a much greater role in the public discourse about nuclear policies. Kubrick’s film 
is one of the few films ever utilized during a political election. Journalists invoked the 
film during the 1964 presidential election to warn voters about the nuclear war they 
believed would result from a Republican victory. Dr. Strangelove provided the media 
with images and language that communicated this threat.   
During this election, critics associated Republican nominee Barry Goldwater with 
the mad position represented by Dr. Strangelove, General Turgidson, and Jack D. Ripper. 
The film ridiculed radical conservatives such as Goldwater, their theories of communist 
subversion, and their willingness to consider nuclear scenarios to conclude the cold war. 
As audience members and critics debated the value of Dr. Strangelove, Goldwater 
temporarily disrupted the Big Sleep. He resurrected the nuclear issue during the 1964 
presidential election.  
Throughout his career, Goldwater advocated a strong nuclear arsenal and an 
aggressive war on communism, but displayed little understanding about the ramifications 
of a nuclear war. Goldwater was a staunch cold warrior and Air Force reserves officer 
who in The Conscience of a Conservative (1960) and Why Not Victory (1962) expressed 
his willingness to use nuclear weapons to halt the spread of communism. According to 
Goldwater, the refusal to consider the use of nuclear weapons provided Communist 
regimes with the freedom to expand their revolution. In The Conscience of a 
Conservative, he recognized two possible conclusions to the cold war: the defeat of the 
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United States as a result of a war with the Soviet Union or an American victory in that 
war.29 
Voters were concerned about the course the cold war might take under 
Goldwater’s direction. The senator opposed the ratification of the Test Ban Treaty, 
claiming that the treaty placed the United States at a disadvantage because the Soviets 
and the Chinese had superior conventional forces. Goldwater argued that radioactive 
fallout amounted to “Communist- induced hysteria.”30 He publicly criticized Kennedy’s 
management of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Berlin wall crisis, and the Cuban missile 
crisis. In each instance, the senator advocated the use of military force to defend 
American interests.31  
In October 1963, Goldwater expressed his support for NATO field commanders’ 
authority to use tactical nuclear weapons. The senator suggested that this authority would 
be necessary to repel a Soviet invasion of Western Europe if communications with the 
president were severed. The Eisenhower administration had initiated this policy, but 
government officials denied its existence. Consequently, Goldwater appeared willing to 
wage a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, while President Lyndon Johnson appeared 
determined to preserve peace. Goldwater’s shoot- from-the-hip style during interviews 
and public addresses produced comments that worried many Americans. Critics thought 
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Goldwater was “trigger happy.” Frightened voters chose Johnson despite the president’s 
growing nuclear arsenal and his commitment to the Vietnam conflict. The Committee for 
a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), traditionally a nonpartisan organization, actively 
campaigned against Goldwater, fearing that he would reinvigorate the arms race.32 
During the campaign, Johnson exploited this fear. He presented himself as the 
peaceful alternative to the warmongering Goldwater, although Johnson continued 
President Kennedy’s aggressive military spending and expanded the US nuclear 
arsenal. 33 To counter these facts, the Doyle Dane Bernbach advertising firm produced 
two commercials for Johnson. The first, which aired 7 September 1964, depicted a little 
girl plucking a daisy in a field. The little girl counts each of the petals she plucks; when 
she reaches ten, a male voice begins to count down to one. When the girl becomes 
startled, the camera focuses on her eye before dissolving to black and then an atomic 
explosion. In a voice-over, Johnson declares, “These are the stakes—to make a world in 
which all of God’s children can live, or go into the dark. We must either love each other, 
or we must die.”34 A few days later another commercial aired depicting a little girl licking 
an ice cream cone narrated by a woman who warns that nuclear tests had once poisoned 
America’s youth. The woman warns voters that Goldwater might resume nuclear tests in 
violation of the Test Ban Treaty. 35 Aired only once each, these commercials depicted 
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young girls, presumably representing the innocence of the nation. Johnson manipulated 
parental instincts, warning voters that a vote for Goldwater placed their children and the 
future of the nation at risk. Months earlier, Kubrick had provided a similar choice to 
audiences, one between life without nuclear weapons and death. 
Critics associated the Republican nominee with Dr. Strangelove. Goldwater was 
associated with Kubrick’s mad characters. He was compared to Strangelove because 
Democrats wanted voters to believe that the Republican candidate was excited by the 
possibility of nuclear war and prepared to attack the Soviet Union at the expense of 
millions of Americans. The cover of the 25 September 1964 issue of Time magazine 
established this relationship.36 It depicted Johnson clad in white, suggesting his desire to 
maintain peace. The cover also featured a photograph of the little girl in the “Daisy” 
commercial, a photograph of the Berlin Wall, and a photograph of several soldiers 
preparing to launch a missile. Barry Goldwater also appeared on the cover, clad in a dark 
suit and pounding his fist during a speech. Beneath Goldwater was a picture of Dr. 
Strangelove, flanked by a partially obscured headline declaring, “Fear Soviet 
Breakthrough in Doomsday Weapon.”37 Editors associated the Republican nominee with 
the mad scientist, suggesting that Kubrick’s scenario could become a reality if voters 
elected Goldwater. Time noted the similarity in an article about the candidates’ nuclear 
strategies, commenting, “Johnson himself conjures up Dr. Strangelove-type images of a 
‘madman’ who unleashes nuclear war.” Johnson advised audiences that casualties of a 
nuclear war could exceed one hundred million Americans, yet he promised that he would 
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not wage a nuclear war.38 He conjured up “Strangelove-type images” to suggest that he 
would preserve peace while a Republican victory in the presidential election would prove 
fatal for millions of Americans. Johnson warned against the policy of a nuclear strike to 
settle a cold war crisis, while he claimed that Goldwater embodied this hawkish position.  
Goldwater’s campaign was also complicated by his connections to the John Birch 
Society. Robert Welch, the society’s founder, had supported Goldwater’s senatorial 
campaign in 1958. The society supported Goldwater’s campaign for the Republican 
presidential nomination in 1960 and 1964. Goldwater attempted to distance himself from 
Welch while at the same time appealing to the society for support. Goldwater disagreed 
with Welch’s claim in The Politician (1958), a treatise on the international communist 
conspiracy and its place in America, that President Dwight Eisenhower was a Communist 
agent. Goldwater’s pleas to the John Birch Society could not inspire a coup to remove 
Welch from power. At the same time, he appeared to advocate Welch’s plan to eliminate 
subversive elements on domestic and foreign battlefields. Welch was prepared to suspend 
civil liberties in order to combat communism. Goldwater echoed Welch’s plan at the 
Republican National Convention, declaring, “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no 
vice. Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.” 39 Goldwater’s opponents 
interpreted this comment as a pledge of support for organizations such as the John Birch 
Society.   
Critics also compared Welch and Goldwater to Adolf Hitler. Time magazine 
equated The Politician with Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Similarly, Fact Magazine claimed that 
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Goldwater “had a mask of sanity covering an inner political madness” not unlike the 
“mask” worn by Hitler as he seized much of Central Europe in the late 1930s. Critics 
accused right-wing conservatives that waved the banner of patriotism of advocating the 
same Gestapo tactics used by Hitler to conquer most of Europe and to exterminate the 
Jews and other groups that did not fit the Aryan model. 40 Goldwater and Welch appeared 
willing to arrest and jail critics of their total war on communism and revive the Palmer 
raids of the first Red Scare and the anti-Communist hearings led by Senator Joseph 
McCarthy in the second Red Scare during early 1950s. In Dr. Strangelove, Kubrick had 
also suggested that a relationship existed between conservatives such as Welch, men who 
wished to wage nuclear war against communism, and the leaders of Nazi Germany. 
Kubrick expressed this relationship through Peter Sellers’ performance as Dr. 
Strangelove, the character that alternated between his American and Nazi halves and 
appeared obsessed with the various aspects of nuclear warfare. These associations and 
comparisons coupled with Goldwater’s statement at the party convention and Johnson’s 
claims that the Republican was willing to wage nuclear war hindered Goldwater’s 
campaign. The candidate proved to be his own worst enemy, providing Democrats and 
the media with imagery that portrayed him as a warmonger not unlike Dr. Strangelove.41  
The similarity was not lost on critics and audiences. Reviewer Brian Forbes 
suggested that Goldwater and the John Birch Society would “attempt to burn the 
cinemas” that displayed Dr. Strangelove because the film challenged the conservatives’ 
faith in the bomb as a peacekeeping tool and their belief in the existence of domestic 
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communist conspiracies. Goldwater and the John Birch Society, said Forbes, had 
acquired a reputation for censorship of “subversive” material. Ronald K. Johnson accused 
Citizen-News film critic Hazel Flynn of supporting the “nonsensical causes” of Barry 
Goldwater and the John Birch Society when she claimed that Dr. Strangelove was an un-
American film.42 Some viewers began to associate the madness displayed in Dr. 
Strangelove with right-wing conservatives’ cold war strategies, not simply U.S. nuclear 
policies. 
Some viewers disagreed with Kubrick’s indictment of the United States, instead 
blaming Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev for the arms race and recent crises. In the 5 
October 1964 issue, US News and World Report questioned, “Is Khrushchev ‘Dr. 
Strangelove?’” The article attempted to redirect the film’s criticism of U.S. nuclear 
policies onto the “real” Dr. Strangelove, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The article 
was inspired by Khrushchev’s claims that Soviet scientists had developed “terrible new 
weapons” believed to be a doomsday device or biological and chemical weapons. Citing 
Khrushchev’s pursuit of more powerful nuclear weapons and his threat to launch nuclear 
weapons against Western Europe, the article claimed that Khrushchev had forced the 
United States to threaten nuclear war to defend America’s European allies.43  
Audiences and critics disputed the quality of the film’s message, but this dispute 
created a forum to discuss the validity of U.S. nuclear policies. Not every American 
readily accepted Kubrick’s criticism of these policies, but many recognized the dangers 
posed by men such as Goldwater and Welch. In 1964, the film provided images and 
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language that were associated with Goldwater, and these associations proved detrimental 
to Goldwater’s campaign. Despite Johnson’s victory, the arms race expanded beyond the 
control of treaties. “Dr. Strangelove” gradually became a derogatory reference to man’s 
inability to control the machines of mass destruction he created and also a reference to 
some men’s belief that a nuclear arsenal capable of destroying the world several times 
over could preserve peace.   
 
